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Beranek:
Prior Restraint of Racial Picketing
NOTES
PRIOR RESTRAINT OF RACIAL PICKETING

The importance of the racial problem in the United States can
hardly be overstated. If evidence be necessary, the almost daily impact of the problem on contemporary society and government can
be seen in today's all-too-numerous incidents of racial violence and in
recent congressional enactments in the area of civil rights.' Truly it
can be said that today's racial movement represents a great and immediate social upheaval within our country. One of the most striking
features of the entire situation is the large role the courts have been
compelled to assume. Although attacks on particular citadels of
racialism have and continue to be extremely varied, the one consistent characteristic appears to be an increased use of the courts. Along
with social, political, and economic pressures, 2 resort to legal process
has been made by all parties concerned at almost every reasonable
opportunity. 3 Thus, although the racial problem has continually
been plagued by violence, its evolution has actually occurred under
a cover of legality. The result has been a continuous recording of
this country's racial strife in a multitude of lower court decisions on
each current crisis as it has arisen. More than ever before these courts
have been called upon to deal with the local, day-to-day problems
of a large and often violent social and political movement. As any
particular racial crisis has unfolded on the pages of the daily newspaper, it has been followed by an almost simultaneous progression of
corresponding litigation. 4 Seldom have the pages of social and political history been so dearly reflected in the records of the law.
The purpose of this note is to consider the manner in which the
courts have dealt with some of these recent crises in an attempt to
better evaluate similar future problems. Consideration will be limited
to the area of prior restraint of racial picketing through injunction.
The major reason for the selection of this limited scope of discussion is the immediate nature of the problem presented by suits for
such injunctions. Unfortunately, violence has often been the direct
or indirect result of racial picketing. When such violence may be
reasonably anticipated and a request for injunction is presented
to a court, the decision must be rendered without the advantages of
leisurely and studied deliberations. As this decision may actually
have the effect of preventing or allowing the immediate occurrence of
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
2. For the effect of Negro boycotts on white merchants see U.S. News & World
Report, Aug. 3, 1956, p. 87.
S. See 8 Cvit. LmEsTm DocKr, No. 1, Highlights (1962).
4. See 8 REL. L. REP. 862 (1963) in which a chronological study of the legal
developments surrounding racial strife in Plaquemine, Louisiana is reported.
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a potentially violent situation, the parties on all sides should have
some reasonable basis on which to predict the outcome. It is intended here to consider, at least, the basic and obvious questions as
to what may be anticipated from such suits. When conditions are
such that violence is allegedly imminent, a more complete understanding of the rights and duties of all parties concerned cannot but
help to promote the nonviolent settlement of at least the immediate
conflict.
DEFINITIONS

As used here "injunction" is intended to include any order or
decree that has the effect of restraining an anticipated activity.
"Picketing" as interpreted by the courts is subject to diverse definition. 5 Certainly, judicial redefinition would be hard pressed to keep
pace with the new and sometimes unusual techniques presently being
developed and employed in the protesting of racial discrimination.
The term is used here in a broad sense and is intended to encompass
such situations as the patrolling of an alleged offender's business
establishment, parades, and public demonstrations in general.6 Although picketing is usually defined as entailing some aspect of economic coercion, 7 such as a business boycott against the party picketed,
this element has been ignored in the present selection of cases. Thus,
activities such as demonstrations before governmental buildings s for
purely political purposes are included.
RELEVANT LEGISLATION

The Civil Rights Act of 1964
Considering recent passage of the Federal Civil Rights Act, 9 any
discussion in this area might be thought to be meaningless. For a
number of reasons this does not appear to be the case. Certainly to
date there is little basis for forecasting the ultimate effect of this
legislation, and even the act's strongest advocates do not contend it
to be a panacea for all questions of race. With regard to the act's
technical legal application in the area of picketing, the Public Accommodations section (Title II)10 will apparently have the greatest
5. See Annot., 83 A.L.R. 200 (1933).
6. But see Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 1284, 1286-87, §1 (1964) in which picketing
is defined in a more limited sense including only those cases involving use of
some sign or symbol and physical proximity to the alleged offender's property.
7. Id. at 1286.
8. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
9. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
10. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, 243 (1964).
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effect. Section 201 (a) of this provision states, "all persons shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of
public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national
origin." Title II then specifically defines a "place of public accommodation" and further provides for injunctive relief against segregation
or discrimination in such places. In addition to this injunctive relief,
if a court believes a reasonable possibility of voluntary compliance
exists, it may refer a suit to the Community Relations Service for a
period of 120 days." It might be argued that Tide II abrogates all
need for picketing by providing other adequate procedures to achieve
the same ends; this is not the case, however, for numerous situations
remain in which picketing and demonstrations may be employed
even in light of Title II.
Initially it would appear that the new statute will not be met with
universal compliance.32 Immediate disobedience of the nondiscrimination requirements may result in a threat of immediate demonstrations
or picketing. Thus, the issue of allowing or prohibiting a potentially
violent situation would again be presented to the court. A similar
issue might also be presented at any time during the 120-day period
in which a case is pending before the Community Relations Service.
Even if an extremely optimistic view is taken and universal compliance with the act is presumed, the areas of conflict and possible
violence are still by no means eliminated. As stated before, Title II
applies only to "places of public accommodation." Section 201 (b) of
that title specifically defines such a place as one dealing in one of
three types of goods or services: lodgings to transient guests, food
served on the premises, and entertainment. Other businesses are
subject to the act only if within one of three classes: (1) businesses
located within specifically covered establishments and offering services
to patrons of those covered establishments; (2) businesses offering
services to patrons of covered establishments located on their own
premises; and (3) those enterprises within which discrimination or
segregation is supported by state law.' 3
In addition to these specific requirements, at least one of two
overriding and constitutionally required foundations are necessary
to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of Title II. The commerce
11. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, 244, 267 (1964).
12. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 393
(N.D. Ga. 1964); appeal docketed, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3092 (U.S. Sept. 22, 1964) (No.

515); Willis v. Pickrick Restaurant, 231 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ga. 1964). Both cases
involve alleged violations of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
13. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE CIVIL RiGnTs Acr
(1964) for discussion of the coverage of Title II.
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clause must be invoked by a finding that the operations of the business affect interstate commerce, 14 or the fourteenth amendment must
be brought into play by a showing of state support of the discrimination or segregation in question.15
As may be seen by the above limitations, Title II is not all-encompassing. For example, certain places such as private clubs,16 beaches
and swimming pools, independent barber shops, and grocery stores
and restaurants that do not affect commerce are not covered. Title
II will not apply to such places, and present standards and laws remain effective as to them. Thus, the possibility of picketing and
resulting violence still exists in these areas and must be dealt with
under preexisting legal concepts.
In addition to Title II, the Fair Employment Practices Law (Title

VII) 1 7 also merits consideration.

This provision forbids racial dis-

crimination in all aspects of employment. Title VII should have
great impact on all future hiring, but since no affirmative corrective
measures are required of employers, 18 problems and protests concerning present racial imbalances in employment may continue to occur.
Thus, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 fails to cover this area, which has
in the past produced racial picketing problems. 19
Unfortunately, in addition to the above problem areas, other
broad and unanswered racial conflicts remain. Although beyond
the scope of the present discussion, the entire area of "de facto segregation" and protests thereto appears untouched by legislation.20 It is

feared that this area may prove fertile ground for future racial
violence.

21

In summation, despite passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
courts and the parties concerned must still deal with the immediate
threats of violence and other remaining problems presented by racial
picketing. It is, therefore, believed that consideration of the general
situation regarding the injunction of picketing is a valid and meaningful endeavor, even in light of current federal legislation.
14. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243 (1964).
15. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243 (1964).
16. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243 (1964).
17. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253 (1964).
18. See BuREAu OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964, at 3
(1964).
19. See Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Fair Share Organization, Inc. v. Mitnick, 188 N.E.2d 840 (App. Ct. Ind. 1963). Both of these cases
involved picketing to protect racial imbalances in employment.
20. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1964, §1, p. 88, col. I containing a report of
the actions on the part of New York City to avoid de facto segregation in public
schools by the "bussing" of children to schools located outside their own school
districts.
21. N. Y. Times, op. cit. supra note 20, which contains a report of the demon-
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Perhaps the greatest impact of the Civil Rights Act in this area
will be the tangible formulation of national policy that it represents.
The act explicitly establishes a policy requiring affirmative promotion of social and economic integration on all racial fronts. This
policy may be expected to have a great impact on judicial decisions
in those areas in which the bill is not technically applicable or in
which its application is dependent on statutory construction. To date
no adequate foundation appears on which to base a meaningful prediction of this impact.
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act
In addition to the effects of civil rights legislation, the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act merits consideration as to its possible application as
a basis for enjoining racial picketing. This act declares illegal all
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade and provides injunctive remedies against such restraints. 22 A question may be
raised whether these injunctive remedies can be invoked against
racial picketing if it is found that the picketing activities are in
actuality a combination in restraint of trade. As noted earlier, picketing is often employed in conjunction with a boycott of the alleged
offender's business. Such picketing and boycotting certainly restrains
trade and if applied in a fashion affecting interstate commerce, the
initial jurisdictional requirements of Sherman would appear to be
satisfied.23 Although the above reasoning appears valid, Sherman
has not been applied in such a manner. Moreover, a number of
uncertainties remain as to the probability of such application.
The determinative question is whether Sherman, an anti-trust law,
is applicable in the noneconomic area of race relations. At present
this precise question is unlitigated, but the Supreme Court has pointed
out that the act is primarily directed at combinations having commercial purposes. 24 On the other hand Sherman has been applied in
a limited number of noneconomic cases outside the racial area.25
As no dear legislative mandate appears regarding the act's application, ultimate determination of the question will probably depend on a balancing of Sherman's policy prohibiting restraint of
strations and arrests growing out of public school "bussing" in New York City.
22. 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. §1 (1958); 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §26

(1958).
23. United States
24. Eastern R.R.
127 (1961).
25. Radovich v.
denied, 353 U.S. 931

v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 120 (1941).
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957), rehearing
(1957); Council of Defense v. International Magazine Co., 267

Fed. 390 (5th Cir. 1920).
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trade against the protective racial policies established by the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The Sherman Act has in the past been subordinated to other more pressing national policies;26 consequently, if
current legislative and social trends are followed it will not be applied in this area of race relations. In any event, application of the
Sherman Act appears as a parallel rather than a necessary consideration to the problem at hand. It is, therefore, excluded from further
consideration in this note.
THE PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE

As a recent United States Supreme Court decision27 points out,
restraint of racial picketing may be applied only in the face of most
compelling circumstances. Admitting this, what should be the decision in an extreme case when a small and peaceful municipality
asks for injunctive relief in the face of immediately anticipated
picketing that will almost certainly result in violence? What, if
anything, may the municipality do to prevent such violence under
present law?
A situation somewhat analogous to the above hypothetical was
presented in State of Alabama ex rel. Flowers v. Zellner.28 This was
an action by the Alabama Attorney General to enjoin a group of
"freedom walkers" from demonstrating in memory of a companion
who had recently been shot and killed while participating in such
a walk. The circuit court of DeKalb County, Alabama, issued a
temporary injunction against such walks stating therein that "the
public welfare, peace and safety" required such restraint.2 9 Suit was
later brought in a federal district court to enjoin the state of Alabama from interfering with plaintiffs' right to demonstrate. 31 In this
later action Alabama's motion to dismiss was granted on grounds
that a court of equity will not ordinarily restrain a state's criminal
prosecutions.
Aside from the over-all moral considerations implicit in any racial
issue, it is obvious that such concrete problems as the above do and
will continue to exist. How are these problems to be met and the
incidents of violence prevented? As stated earlier, the major front
of the integration battle has been in the area of legal redress. A
26.

See NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES at 5 (1960) in which

the author points out that the policy of the Sherman Act may be overridden, giving
as an example the specific exemptions that have been provided for union activity.
27. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963).
28. 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 848 (1963). Unreported injunction order by the
circuit court of DeKalb County, Alabama, May 7, 1963.

29. Ibid.
30. Zellner v. Lingo, 218 F. Supp. 513 (M.D. Ala. 1963).
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continuation of this pattern seems indicated by recent cases such as
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v.
Button.31 In this case the Supreme Court upheld the right of the
NAACP to solicit civil rights litigation from Negroes in general.
This holding was based on a finding that such litigation constituted
a form of constitutionally protected political expression. The legality
of such solicitation activities and a rising tide of Negro enthusiasm
assures that an even greater number of alleged civil rights violations
will be brought before the courts in the future. Partly in response
to this increasing litigation, and in reaction to the acceleration of
the entire racial movement, attempts at legal sanctions against picketing and other demonstrations also appear to be increasing. Under
our system these problems must be met and answered without delay
when presented to the courts. But, is an injunction the proper remedy?
Picketing as a ConstitutionalRight
At the turn of the century an extreme minority of courts took
the position that picketing itself was unlawful and to be condemned
under any circumstances. 32 In light of present cases33 such earlier
decisions must be regarded as evidencing little more than a historically
interesting position. Regarding the right to picket in general, the
first amendment to the Constitution precludes federal limitations on
the right of peaceful assembly, and the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment has been held to prevent denial of this right by
the states.34 In addition, the related right of freedom of association
for the advancement of beliefs and ideas has also been held to be
protected by the due process clause. 35 In Dejonge v. Oregon3 6
peaceful assembly was held to be cognate to the right of free speech
and to be equally fundamental with that right. Although awarded
this apparent rank as a first amendment freedom, the "policy of
liberality protecting other methods for exercising [this] right is not
entirely applicable in picketing cases." 37 This apparent limitation is
based on the fact that picketing is held to be more than mere free

31. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
32. Beck v. Railvay Teamsters' Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N.W. 13
(1898); Jensen v. Cooks' Union, 39 Wash. 531, 81 Pac. 1069 (1905).
33. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353 (1937).
34. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
35. National Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S.

449 (1958).
36. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
37. 93 A.L.R.2d 1284, at 1288 (1964).
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speechA8 The activity constituting the picketing may encompass
additional elements that are properly enjoinable, such as obstruction
of streets and sidewalks 39 or actual violence on the part of the picketers. Thus, to the extent that picketing includes these other enjoinable elements, it is more than free speech and is not regarded with
the same degree of protection awarded pure speech. As with all
°
constitutional rights, abuses thereof are subject to limitation.
Abrogation of Labor Principles
In 1940 picketing, per se, was expressly held to be within formal
constitutional protections. This holding occurred in Thornhill v.
A labama,41 which involved a labor dispute. As indicated by Thornhill, many early decisions that actually concerned racial picketing
were decided on the basis of labor legislation and policy. Another
early employment of labor law in the racial area may be seen in
New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co. 42 In this 1938 case a
group of Negroes combined to picket a grocery store chain in order
to induce the employment of colored clerks. The United States
Supreme Court characterized this activity as a "labor dispute" and
it was thus held to be controlled by the Norris-La Guardia Act.
Under the terms of this act the Court found it was without jurisdiction to grant the injunction prayed for by the subjects of the picketing. More recently, the Supreme Court has indicated that racial
picketing is to be recognized more clearly as the form of social ex43
pression that it apparently has assumed under present conditions.
Thus labor legislation has been abrogated as a major consideration
in the area and racial picketing has moved closer to the position of
freedom of expression. Today, a separation appears between the labor
and racial issues. The basic right to picket is irrevocably established 4 and the overwhelming number of decisions uphold that right, whether
5
or not the alleged grievance concerns a labor dispute.4

38. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464 (1950).
39. People v. Sinclair, 86 Misc. 426, 149 N.Y. Supp. 54 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1914),
aff'd, 167 App. Div. 899, 151 N.Y. Supp. 1136 (1915).
40. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
41. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
42. 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
43. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
44. 93 A.L.R.2d 1284 (1964), see this annotation for discussion and citation
of cases concerning nonlabor picketing and boycotting.
45. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Allen v. District
of Columbia, 187 A.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Annot. 93A A.L.R.2d 1284, 1290 (1964).
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NonlegalFactors
Although the constitutional position of racial picketing appears
to be clearly defined, the decisions in the area have not been harmonious. There are, of course, a multitude of factors behind any
judicial decision; this is especially true in the racial area. Charges
of prejudice have been made against both the bench and bar. Undoubtedly, predispositions and prejudice must play some part in the
formulation of any decision, judicial or otherwise. Although it is
realized these factors may have great impact on courts' decisions, and
that they should certainly be considered in reviewing those decisions,
speculation as to the possible effect of such factors is considered beyond the scope of present discussion.
BASIc REQUISITES

Peaceful Picketing
Courts generally speak of lawful picketing as entailing at least
two basic requisites. It must be (1) peaceful2 6 and (2) for a lawful
purpose. 47 In regard to the first requisite, a prohibition of actual
violence by the picketers themselves appears obvious. As with any
constitutional right, abuses thereof may be restrained. When considering whether picketing in a specific factual situation is or is not
peaceful it becomes necessary to distinguish between the actions of
the pickets and those of the audience. With little question, the actual
pickets may be enjoined if it can be shown that such persons will
act in a violent manner. 48 On the other hand, more complex problems
arise regarding anticipated violent reactions by the public in response
to the picketing. As a general rule, it may be said that insofar as
picketing is protected as a first amendment freedom, it cannot be
enjoined merely because of the violent reactions of others. 49 This
"problem of hostile audience reaction"50 is often a paramount consideration to a court when presented with a request for injunctive
relief. This area will be dealt with later in greater detail.

46. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
47. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Fair Share Organization v.
Mitnick, 188 N.E.2d 840 (App. Ct. Ind. 1963).
48. Green v. Samuelson, 168 Md. 421, 178 At. 109 (1935).
49. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Allen v. District of
Columbia, 187 A.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
50. Note, Freedom of Speech and Assembly; The Problem of the Hostile
Audience, 49 CoLuM. L. REv. 1118 (1949).
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When measured by the specific requirement of lawful purpose,
racial picketing has been held enjoinable in a number of instances. 5 1
In Fair Share Organization v. Mitnick5 2 picketing was enjoined in
Indiana when its purpose was to force an employer to hire a Negro
clerk, even if he had to discharge a white clerk to do so. Because
Indiana's Fair Employment Practice Act prohibited reference to race
in regard to employment, the picketing was enjoinable as promoting
the unlawful end of discrimination in favor of Negro employment.
In the 1950 case of Hughes v. Superior Court of California,"3 the
United States Supreme Court reinforced the above position. In
Hughes picketers demanded an employer hire Negroes in his store
until the proportion of Negro to white clerks approximated the
proportion of Negro to white customers, which at the time was about
fifty per cent. In holding that this picketing constituted more than
free speech, 54 the Court found the actions of defendant picketers
to be enjoinable because they contravened California's policy against
quota and proportional hiring on the basis of race. The Hughes
court concluded that a "state is not required to tolerate in all places
and all circumstances even peaceful picketing by an individual." 55
These cases establish the principle that racial picketing may be enjoined when a state can show that the purpose of the picketing is
unlawful or against the state's public policy,56 when such policy is not
in contravention of federal policy or law.
In cases in which the purpose of picketing is not unlawful the
requirement of lawful purpose becomes interrelated with an overriding balancing test. 57 Although a recent Supreme Court case 58
indicates an apparent retreat from the balancing concept, the theory
of this test is that courts will first look to the purpose of the
picketing. If lawful, the question is resolved into a balancing of the
51. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Young Adults for Progressive Action v. B & B Cash Grocery Stores, 151 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1963); Fair
Share Organization v. Mitnick, 188 N.E.2d 840 (App. Ct. Ind. 1963).
52. 188 N.E.2d 840 (App. Ct. Ind. 1963).
53. 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
54. Id. at 464-65.
55. Id. at 466.
56. See Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 466-69 (1950); Fair Share
Organization, Inc. v. Mitnick, 188 N.E.2d 840 (App. Ct. Ind. 1963).
57. See A. S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson, 153 Misc. 363, 370, 274 N.Y. Supp.
946, 955 (Sup. Ct. 1934), where in attempting to balance interests of Negro pickets
against interests of picketed merchants the courts stated, "Each case may be
decided on its own facts, by a balancing of those considerations which make for
a sound public policy."
58. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
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interests of the picketers against the interests of the public or the
particular individuals picketed. An application of this test can be
seen in Clemmons v. Congress of Racial Equality5- in which the
sheriff, police chief, and mayor of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, were
granted an injunction against racial demonstrations. In granting
the injunction, a federal district court held that defendant's rights
to free speech and assembly were subordinate to the state's interest
in public safety, which had been jeopardized by defendant's actions.
The Negro group named as defendant had promoted the picketing
of twelve stores in the area and caused traffic and pedestrian congestion. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed 0 the granting of
the injunction by holding that plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a
federal cause of action in the lower district court. The issues of free
speech and assembly and the injunctive restrictions thereon were not
reached as the reversal was purely on jurisdictional grounds. In
Young Adults for ProgressiveAction v. B. & B Cash Grocery Stores,61
Negroes were enjoined from picketing certain stores in protest of their
employment policies. The court held that the right of the store owner
to exclude Negroes from upper-level jobs was to be protected and
that such employment policies were not sufficient justification for the
picketing.
As pointed out earlier, recent cases, of which Edwards v. South
Carolina62 is the most outstanding, appear contrary to the above
decisions. In Edwards 187 Negroes were arrested for breach of the
peace when they demonstrated on the South Carolina state capitol
grounds. The group walked in an orderly fashion bearing placards
and singing in a demonstration protesting alleged segregation. Upon
their failure to disperse, after being ordered to do so, the group was
arrested. Their convictions were affirmed by a South Carolina court
on the grounds that, although no actual violence had taken place,
the conduct was such as to threaten an imminent breach of the peace.
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed the convictions holding the picketing to be constitutionally protected and
immune from state curtailment. Although Edwards presented no
issue as to prior injunction of the picketing, its impact on this area
of the law can hardly be overemphasized.
The strong Edwards holding specifically treats picketing as a
constitutionally protected form of free speech and deals with it from
the most protective point of view yet assumed. Edwards indicates that
if the purpose of picketing is lawful, a great deal of counterbalancing
59.
60.
61.
62.

201 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. La. 1962).
328 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1963).
151 So. 2d 877 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
372 U.S. 229 (1963).
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public interest will be necessary to subordinate the rights of the
picketers to the rights of the public. The balancing test is not specifically abrogated by either Edwards or Clemmons, but in light of
such decisions and the probable overriding policy influences of the
Federal Civil Rights Act, it appears that an extremely pressing and
overwhelming public or individual interest will be required before
picketing may be enjoined on the basis of the balancing test alone.
The Edwards decision does not specifically overrule any of the existing
principles related to the enjoinment of picketing, but the protective
manner in which it deals with picketing has the effect of imposing a
much higher standard of justification for the issuance of an injunction
than was heretofore required.
The above discussion points up a larger problem yet to come, that
is, what purposes may a state declare unlawful or against public
policy in light of present case law and civil rights legislation? Generally, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 explicitly establishes a national
policy strongly promoting desegregation. What effect does this
national policy have on the statutes and policies of states that do
not correspond to the affirmative promotion of such ends?
Other Requisites
In addition to the basic requisites of peacefulness and lawful purpose there is also authority holding that persons picketing in nonlabor situations must have some special interest in the alleged grievance. 63 Judicial consideration of this point in the racial area appears
almost nonexistent,64 and it is thought that overriding policy considerations have relegated the issue to an unimportant position. In
any event, it would appear that the interest of the entire public in
the national racial situation would be sufficient to rule out the use
of this concept as a bar to racial picketing.
THE PROBLEM OF THE HOSTILE AUDIENCE

As alluded to earlier, the problem of hostile audience reaction may
be of paramount importance in cases seeking injunctions of picketing.
Tersely put, the question faced by the court in some extreme cases
may be whether there will be immediate violence in the streets if
the injunction is not issued. If the court refuses to issue the injunction a related question is raised whether the state's police force
will be adequate to both protect the picketers and prevent the anticipated violence. A similar situation was alleged to have occurred
63. People v. Sinclair, 86 Misc. 426, 149 N.Y. Supp. 54 (Sup. Ct.), afi'd, 167
App. Div. 899, 151 N.Y. Supp. 1136 (1915).
64. See 93 A.L.R.2d 1284, 1294 (1964).
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in regard to recent racial violence in St. Augustine, Florida.6 5 After
numerous violent incidents growing out of nighttime parades had
occurred, the Governor of Florida invoked emergency powers and
issued an executive order68 that stated in part: "not withstanding my
vigorous and aggressive effort to strengthen law enforcement ... to
the maximum, the situation has progressively worsened in spite of
the presence of state law 'enforcement officers sent into St. Augustine
on June 10 and has worsened since state law enforcement officers were
strengthened on June 15, 1964."67 Based on these grounds, the order
concluded with a prohibition of all future nighttime demonstrations.
Fortunately, there have been few such extreme cases. Many times a
court that is desirous of enjoining picketing it fears may produce
violence, can find some law or ordinance that technically allows a
finding that the picketing is for an unlawful purpose.68 The problem
considered here is what happens when the issue is more clear-cut,
that is, where the picketing is lawful but may still produce violence.
Certainly states can and must stop riots after they have begun, but
what can be done prior to that time by injunction?
As stated earlier, the general rule in regard to audience reaction
is: that portion of picketing, which represents the first amendment
right of free speech, may not be enjoined merely because it is likely
to provoke violence on the part of onlookers. 69 Although this principle is well established, a seemingly contrary view was presented
by M. Justice Clark's dissent in Edwards v. South Carolina. He
stated:70
The question thus seems to me whether a State is constitutionally prohibited from enforcing laws to prevent breach of
the peace in a situation where city officials in good faith believe,
and the record shows, that disorder and violence are imminent,
merely because the activities constituting that breach contain
claimed elements of constitutionally protected speech and assembly. To me, the answer under our case is clearly in the
negative.
65. See 9 RAcE REt.. L. REP.590 (1964).
66. Executive Order No. 2 by Farris Bryant as Governor of the State of
Florida, filed with the Florida Secretary of State for public record as of 20 June
1964; issued pursuant to the Proclamation by Farris Bryant as Governor of the
State of Florida, filed with the Florida Secretary of State for public record as of
15 June 1964.
67. Executive Order No. 2 by Farris Bryant as Governor of the State of
Florida, p. 3, 6, filed with the Florida Secretary of State for public record as of
20 June 1964.
68. See 8 RAcE REL.L. REP. 862-74 (1963).
69. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, supranote 49.
70. 372 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
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It should be remembered that this view, which may be interpreted
to allow restraint of picketing, was not expressed in regard to an injunction, but concerned the arrest of persons after an alleged breach
of the peace had taken place. Certainly the standards for the granting
of an injunction are more stringent than those for the prevention of
violence after it has begun.
Nevertheless, states have attempted on numerous occasions to
follow the view of Justice Clark within the injunction area. Many
such actions have occurred in the lower federal courts and in state,
county, and municipal courts. Of the cases in which injunctions have
71
been granted, a great percentage have met with reversal on appeal.
Herein lies one of the hidden aspects of this problem. Often the
purpose of an injunction will be fulfilled if it accomplishes nothing
more than to enforce a brief cooling-off period. An injunction or
temporary restraining order is seldom meant to have long-range legal
effects. If it be issued and enforced during a particular crisis, then
subsequent dissolution by an appellate court is often of little consequence to the original parties. An example of this may be seen in
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v.
Webb's City.72 In this case Negro pickets protesting segregated facilities obstructed plaintiff's doorways, mildly harrassed store officials,
and made numerous phone calls to employees. This activity was
enjoined by a state court on grounds, among others, that it tended
toward violence and disorder. The decision was subsequently reversed
by the United States Supreme Court for mootness7 3 when plaintiff
voluntarily agreed to have the injunction set aside. Thus, although
the legality of this injunctive measure was ultimately abrogated by
reversal, the effect was to enforce a brief cooling-off period on the
tense situation that had prompted the initial action. Similar situations have occurred in federal courts. In Griffon v. Congress of
Racial Equality74 city officials sought an injunction against racial
demonstrations by Negro organizations. The federal district court
issued a temporary restraining order upon finding that a delay in
granting relief would probably result in violence and injury to a
substantial number of persons. This order was issued on August 21,
1963. After nine days, during which time the order was in force, the
Congress of Racial Equality requested the federal court of appeals to

71. See, e.g., National Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. Webb's City,
84 Sup. Ct. 635 (1964); Congress of Racial Equality v. Clemmons, 323 F.2d 54

(5th Cir. 1963).
72. 152 So. 2d 179 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
73. National Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. Webb's City, 84
Sup. Ct. 635 (1964).
74. 221 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. La. 1963).
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dissolve the restraining order. This motion was granted 5 on grounds
that the district court judge who originally issued the order had been
out of the state since its issuance, and defendants had thus been unable to obtain a hearing on their motion to dismiss. There followed
various legal proceedings on both sides during which several injunctions were issued and subsequently dissolved 6 Thus, as in the Webb's
City case, the ultimate legality of these injunctions met with reversal,
but the resulting legal processes produced an enforced delay in
overt activities and anticipated violence.
In the summer of 1963 mass Negro demonstrations and related
violence occurred in Danville, Virginia. 7 One result of these demonstrations was the issuance of an injunction against further picketing
by the Corporation Court of the City of Danville3 8 Defendants were
charged with contempt when they demonstrated in the face of this
injunction. There ensued a complicated number of legal developments that culminated in a federal injunction prohibiting state
officers from prosecuting persons charged with violations of the
original city injunction.7 9 The federal injunction was made binding
pending determination of appeals filed by the defendants in federal
courts. Thus, although defendants were not ultimately prosecuted
for their breaches of the injunction, the immediate threat of violence
that would have resulted from further picketing was forestalled.
The Danville situation and the Webb's City and Griffon cases
seem to indicate that a municipality may often seek an injunction
looking to its immediate effect and in disregard of its ultimate legality.
If the injunction can prevent the immediate crises, then it matters
little to the municipality if it is subsequently overruled by a higher
court. The dilatory nature of such legal proceedings may even provide time during which the need for the picketing may be abolished
through the mutual efforts of both parties. This appears probable in
many situations for it is obvious that the mass demonstration is a
potent weapon. The anti-integration factions must realize, however,
that the granting of the injunction is at best a temporary victory and
may thus be willing to enter the area of reasonable compromise.
Hypothesizing the possible pragmatic value of such injunctions,
how does their use square with the rule that violent audience reaction
is no excuse for the enjoinment of peaceful picketing as it is constitutionally protected? 0 Certainly a court may not legally evade this
75. 8 RACE RFL L. REP. 864 (1963).
76. 8 RAcE REL.. L. REP. 862-74 (1963). See these pages for a chronological
listing of the events and actions involved in this litigation.
77. 8 RACE RL. L. REP. 879-84 (1963).
78. 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 434 (1963), herein the injunction by the city court
is reported in full.
79. 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 879-80 (1963).
80. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, supra note 49.
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rule under the guise of granting temporary relief for a tense situation.
The constitutional right to picket is not subject to violation merely
because that violation be temporary.
As stated earlier, picketing is enjoinable in a number of situations.
If it is not in itself peaceful, it may be prohibited.81 If its purpose is
unlawful or against valid public policy, it may be proscribed.8 2 And
if the interests sought to be furthered do not outweigh, in social
desirability, the harmful consequences likely to result, then it may be
enjoined under the balancing test. 83 Under this latter classification
are such interests as a state's nondiscriminatory employment policies,
the public's right to free and unobstructed use of the streets and
sidewalks, and the right of the public to be free from unreasonable
risks of violence.
If a court enjoins picketing solely in an honest attempt to prevent
violence that may result from audience reaction, and one of the
above grounds is not present, the injunction must clearly be unconstitutional. This appears particularly true in light of the Supreme
Court's pronouncements in Edwards 4 in which the Court stated
that: 85
Speech [which was in this case equated to picketing] is often
provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudice and
preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it
presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of
speech . . . is . . . protected against censorship or punishment,
unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of
a serious substantial evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.
Edwards applied this standard to the restraint of picketing after
it had begun. Surely no less stringent criterion may be applied to
impose prior restraint through injunction. If any conclusion may be
drawn concerning this problem of hostile audience reaction, it must
be that constitutional safeguards conclusively prohibit its use as the
sole ground for enjoining lawful racial picketing. Although courts
in the past have not uniformly accepted this rule, the practice and
practicability of enjoining such picketing on these grounds alone cannot long survive. It is, today, outside the law.

81. See Edwards v. South Carolina, supra note 46.
82. See Hughes v. Superior Court, supra note 47.
83. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery, 303 U.S. 552, 554 (1938); A. S.
Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson, 153 Misc. 363, 370, 274 N.Y. Supp. 946, 955 (Sup. Ct.
1934).
84. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
85. Id. at 237.
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It appears that lower federal courts have in some cases proceeded
to adopt the protective policies pronounced in Edwards. Indications
that such courts may in the future prevent even the temporary injunctive restraint of picketing are discernible in the legal proceedings
arising from the recent events in St. Augustine, Florida. After several
incidents of racial violence involving evening parades had occurred,
the city placed a ban on all nighttime demonstrations. On the day the
ban became effective Negro plaintiffs gave notice by telegram of a
suit for an injunction against the ban. A temporary injunction was
subsequently issued at a hearing occurring three days later.8 6 In a
further attempt to forestall anticipated violence, the Governor of
Florida issued an executive order prohibiting public demonstrations
after 8:30 p.m. 87 Within two days of this order the same federal
district court issued an order to the governor and attorney general of
the state to show cause why they should not be held in contempt
for violation of the court's original injunction.88 Before the contempt
question came to hearing, conciliatory action resulted in voluntary
abstention from further evening demonstrations. 9 Thus, although
the contempt proceeding was ultimately discontinued, the actions of
this federal court indicate that in the future even temporary restraints
on picketing may be subjected to prompt and sweeping federal curtailment.
The above discussion points up a further problem area regarding
the use of executive power in the restraint of picketing. Certainly
the Florida situation is not determinative of this issue and although
beyond the scope of present discussion, it is believed that the use of
such executive power will prove to be of increasing importance in
this general area.
AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES

Under our present law, when a violent audience reaction does
threaten, two alternatives appear open to a state. First, peaceful
compromise and concession on the part of both parties or an actual
change of position on the part of one. Secondly, if steps cannot be
taken to abrogate the risks of violence, the state must accept and
efficiently discharge its duty to provide adequate police facilities and
personnel both to protect the picketers and to prevent the anticipated

86. 9 RAcF REL. L. RxP. 590, 597 (1964).
87. Proclamation, note 66 supra.
88. Unreported Order to Show Cause, No. 64-133-Civ.-J., issued by the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Division. Filed 22
June 1964 with the clerk of the court.
89. See Time Magazine, July 10, 1964, p. 27.
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violence. 90 According to federal pronouncements,9 " the audience rather than the picketers is to be regulated and restrained. This places
a rather heavy burden on a small municipality unaccustomed and
ill-equipped to deal with violent conditions involving large groups
of people. This is especially true in situations in which a large percentage of those involved in the picketing are nonlocal persons who
2
have been brought to the locality specifically for that purpose .
Nevertheless, the protection of the public is the duty of the states. If
the state fails in this responsibility, it would seem the federal government must and will intervene. Thus it appears a state may in some
circumstances be painted into the proverbial corner. It fears it will
be unable to control the population yet it is prohibited from regulating the picketers who, through peaceful means, may provide the
unwanted spark of violence. The dilemma at present, appears unresolved.
PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF INJUNCTION - A FUTURE PROBLEM
Hypothesizing the existence of facts warranting the issuance of an
injunction, questions arise as to its permissible scope. In Anora
Amusement Corp. v. Doe,93 plaintiff sought to enjoin a Negro organization from picketing a theater. The request was denied on condition
that no more than two pickets would patrol the sidewalk at any one
time. In effect, this decision enjoined any more than a certain number of persons from picketing. An additional and more extreme
example of such limiting injunctions may be seen in the recent
Florida case of Tallahassee Theatres v. Due,94 which also enjoined
theater picketing. After a large number of Negroes were arrested for
violating the injunction, it was modified to allow for alleged reasonable and orderly demonstrations. The court even went to the extent
of setting the number of picketers allowed at each theater, the required space between them (approximately eight feet), and the
physical actions and locations that would be allowed at each theater.
Appeals from these orders were subsequently dismissed by a Florida
appellate court on a procedural issue. 95 Although little judicial authority exists concerning the use of injunctions that merely limit
90. Edwards v. South Carolina, supra note 8, at 233. See the court's footnote
7 where testimony from the trial court concerning adequacy of police protection is
cited in showing that there was no clear and present danger of violence.
91. Edwards v. South Carolina, supra note 8.
92. See Clemmons v. Congress of Racial Equality, 201 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. La.
1962), rev'd, 323 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1963).
93. 12 N.Y.S.2d 400, 171 Misc. 279 (1939).
94.

8

RACE REL.

L. REP. 636 (1963).

95. Due v. Tallahassee Theatres, Inc., 160 So. 2d 169 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
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picketing, this appears to be a likely future problem area. The constitutional right to picket, as it is protected under free speech, may
not be temporarily or partially violated. If the picketing does not
fall within the prohibitable area as established by Edwards v. South
Carolina, it would seem to be no less immune to partial limits than
from total injunction. This appears to be a problem with which
the courts have yet to deal. It is suspected that states may, in the
future, assert this concept of reasonable limitation via partial injunction as an answer to the dilemma between restraint of the public
or the pickets.
CONCLUSION

Picketing has been and will continue to be a major problem in
the racial picture. The grounds on which such picketing may be
enjoined are extremely limited. The picketing must in itself be nonpeaceful, for an illegal purpose, or likely to produce harmful effects
of much greater consequence than the anticipated good. Although
possibly of some pragmatic and temporary utility, an injunction
against peaceful picketing may not be grounded solely on anticipated
hostile audience reaction. A state must control the response of the
audience rather than the expression of the picketers, and the inconvenience and added police burden involved is no justification for
infringing the right to freedom of expression.
The manner in which courts have dealt with this problem of
hostile audience reaction may be viewed as an attempted reconciliation
of diverse policy ends. On one hand is the fact that no government
can long survive if it allows riots and violence within the population.
Balanced against this fact, which favors prior restraint of potentially
violent situations, is the policy of protecting and promoting free
expression of unpopular social issues, such as racial integration. In
short, the problem can be characterized as an attempt to achieve an
ordered and nonviolent state of society, while allowing for expression, via public demonstrations, of racial demands that may often
provoke public violence. Certainly, today, the ultimate solution to
this problem appears obscure. Nevertheless, the courts are presented
with the immediate task of reconciling these conflicting policies
within the framework of the tense and rapidly changing area of race
relations.
Recent judicial decisions at least lend some clarity to the problem
by almost completely rejecting injunctive relief as a solution. The
parties involved are thus compelled to realistically face a more clearcut set of alternatives. Anticipated audience violence cannot be asserted as grounds for restraint and if such violence does occur, and is
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not controlled, federal intervention is likely. The picketing may
proceed, and under present law, the audience may not resist. Hopefully, one result of this present policy will be to force the interested
parties into reasonable negotiations with an eye toward peaceful
settlement. The courts' actions in this area appear to leave no other
reasonable alternative.
If the anti-integration factions realize that prior restraint will not
be allowed, they should more fully appreciate the necessity for their
own self discipline. Similarly, civil rights groups must also realize
that the exercise of any right entails a corresponding duty to do so
with respect for the rights of others. An appreciation and acceptance
of these responsibilities by all parties would seem to be the necessary
first step in establishing a basis from which to peacefully resolve
the existing conflicts.
In summation, although picketing is more than free speech, this
concept is not so strongly held now as when initially established.
Today, if picketing is in itself peaceful and for the purpose of protesting racial segregation, it may be almost equated to pure free
speech. Thus, it appears that peaceful racial picketing is, in almost
all circumstances, immune from prior restraint.
JOHN
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